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Patenting Games:
Baker v. Selden Revisited
Shubha Ghosh*
ABSTRACT
Patents are meant to protect the functional aspects of an
invention. But patents, particularly patents on processes or methods,
can cover non-functional, or expressive, activity. This Article explores
this possibility in the context of patents covering games of various
types. Patents on games can cover the actual play or use of a game
with consequent implications for user-generated content produced by
playing games. The Article documents this possibility in the area of
fantasy sports and video games and proposes two solutions. The first
solution relies on the Federal Circuit's recent decision in In re Bilski,
which restricts the patenting of processes that produce social
transformations, and explores the implications of this case for patents
on games. The second solution draws on the Supreme Court's decision
in Baker v. Selden, a precedent associated with restrictions on
copyrightable subject matter that purported to establish a boundary
between patent and copyright. Consequently, the precedent has
implications for patentable subject matter as well as for copyrightable
subject matter. The Article concludes that the precedent of Baker v.
Selden excludes functional subject matter from copyright protection
and non-functional, or expressive, subject matter from patent
protection. Therefore, patents on processes should not extend to the
non-functional uses of the invention, such as the actual playing of a
game by users of a patented game.
Professor of Law and Honorary Fellow, The University of Wisconsin Law
School, and Associate Director, Institutes for Studies in Transformational
Entrepreneurship, The University of Wisconsin, Madison. J.D, Stanford, 1994; M.A., Ph.D.,
The University of Michigan, 1988; B.A., Amherst College, 1984. The author would like to
thank participants at the 2008 User-Generated Content, Social Networking and Virtual
Worlds Roundtable at Vanderbilt University Law School for reactions and comments.
Thanks in particular to Scott Boone and Jerry Reichman, who served as constructive
commentators, and to Steven Hetcher, who organized the event.
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I. GAMES, USERS, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Games defy categorization. They are a source of recreation and
a break from the utilitarian and dreary. They are also incredibly
functional, serving as therapy, as tools to delve into ourselves, and as
means to create community, organization, and camaraderie. Games
can be experiments, methods of accumulating data to test models of
human behavior, psychology, and epidemiology. Ends in and of
themselves as well as means to various ends, games play many roles.
They may, perhaps, be the defining paradigm for how we live our
lives, structure our societies, and establish our relationships.
Moreover, with games intersecting more with virtual worlds and
traditional games moving online, the law must be able to reconcile
virtual play and performance, as well as preserve the traditional
values of play within virtual environments.
With all of these roles that games play, it is not surprising that
they also test the boundaries of intellectual property law. This Article
is about the relationship between patent and play. It explores those
boundaries by addressing the question of patentable subject matter in
light of recent Federal Circuit decisions and the U.S. Supreme Court
precedent of Baker v. Selden,1 which dealt with the boundaries
between patent and copyright. My particular focus is on the
expansion of patents in the field of gaming and their effect on the
actual playing of the game, specifically on activity generated by users
as opposed to that generated by machines. Patent claims, which
1. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
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define the legal metes and bounds of the patent owner's right to
exclude, are drafted in the field of gaming to cover actual game play,
thereby giving the patent owner the right to enjoin the playing of a
game. This scope of patent rights contrasts with copyright, which
largely does not cover the live performance of a work. The potential
strength of patent rights, as compared to copyrights, is the focus of
this Article. How can patent rights be limited so that they leave the
actual playing of a game-the source of user-generated activity and
content-unrestricted by intellectual property law? Recent Federal
Circuit case law and the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in Baker, I
argue, offer the answer to this question.
A. Game Play
Playing a game is a live performance and does not fall under
copyrightable subject matter. 2 The rules of a game, however, are
functional and procedural, and therefore could arguably be protected
by patent law. 3  By freeing games from copyright protection,
intellectual property law allows players to participate in games as
performances. 4 If play is turned into commercial property, then the
performance of a game becomes an audiovisual work that can be
copied, transmitted, and adapted for a fee. 5  Furthermore, some
players become celebrities whose personalities can be marketed,
2. See, e.g., Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players' Ass'n, 805
F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986) (examining copyrightability of the live performance of a baseball
game and ownership of a recorded broadcast); Morissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d
675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967) (addressing the noncopyrightability of beauty pageant
proceedings); Prod. Contractors, Inc. v. WGN Cont'l Broad.Co., 622 F. Supp. 1500, 1503
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (addressing the noncopyrightability of a Christmas parade).
3. See, e.g., Board Game Apparatus, U.S. Patent No. 2,026,082 (filed Aug. 1, 1935)
(issued Dec. 1935) (covering rules for Monopoly board game). For an analysis of the
patenting of game rules and their relationship to copyright, see Pamela Samuelson, Why
Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1921, 1943-45 (2007).
4. See, e.g., Julie Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 347, 372-73 (2005) (analyzing the role of play in users transforming and working with
expressive works). For the classic analysis of play and games, see JOHAN HUIZINGA, HOMO
LUDENS 76 (1944) (noting that, unlike play, law focuses on stability and fixation, but does
include elements of play in certain contexts such as litigation); ROGER CAILLOIS, MAN,
PLAY & GAMES 54 (Meyer Brash trans., 1961) (building on Huizinga's proposition by
creating a taxonomy of games to include games of competition, games of chance, games of
simulation, and games of vertigo).
5. See Baltimore Orioles, Inc., 805 F.2d at 671 (discussing broadcast rights in
games).
2009]
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT AND TECH. LAW
branded, and franchised. 6  All these moves permit the
commercialization of the underlying free and open play. More
strikingly, the intellectual property rights that are created permit the
extension of the underlying game into the marketplace, creating an
aesthetic heralded by autograph signings, Super Bowl parties,
camaraderie at sports bars, and the exhilaration of fans collecting
memorabilia. Unprotected play on the field translates into play that
can be bought and sold in the marketplace as payment by players
reveal and raise the value of the commoditized game.
My argument in this Article is that patenting games changes
this dynamic by potentially turning the once-unprotected performance
of a game into a commoditized asset that itself can be bought, sold,
and restricted. Copyright law protects images that are captured in
movies, but leaves unprotected the exhilaration, the adrenaline rush,
and the exuberance of the actors and the audience. Patents on games,
however, will potentially protect the rush of performance unless
policymakers draw a line regarding the enforcement of game patents.
My specific concern is that patents on methods of playing may
interfere with the performance of games. While live performances are
not protected by copyright law, they can be protected by patent law.
Consequently, patent ownership of gaming can constrain the rights of
game users. As I describe in greater detail in Part II, contemporary
patenting strategies in the gaming industry have extended protection
to the live play of the game as well as ergonomic gaming technologies,
such as the Wii and other interactive devices. In this way, live
performances become proprietary under patent law in ways that they
could not be under copyright law. This Article presents the current
status of patents on games and offers a critique that is intended as a
guide for how gaming patents should be enforced.
B. The Baker Court's Analysis
As I demonstrate, the policy issues raised by gaming patents
parallel those raised over a hundred years ago in the famous copyright
case Baker v. Selden.7 At issue in that case was the copyrightability of
an accounting book, a controversy that allowed the U.S. Supreme
Court to pontificate on the boundary between patent and copyright
law and between utilitarian and aesthetic works. The analysis of the
Court in Baker has been integrated into modern copyright law
6. See id. at 675 (discussing right of publicity claims of baseball players); see also
C.B.C. Distrib. and Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d
818, 823-24 (8th Cir. 2007) (discussing right of publicity rights of baseball players).
7. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
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through Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976, which excludes
methods, systems, and processes from copyright protection.8
Paralleling the doctrinal development of Section 102(b) is the
evolution of copyrightable subject matter, including functional and
utilitarian items such as computer software, databases, statutes, boat
hulls, and architectural works. Throughout this evolution, courts
have attempted to keep the distinctions made originally in Baker alive
while recognizing the market realities of the creative process through
judicious application of the case's holding.9
While copyright excludes processes, methods, and systems from
copyrightable subject matter, patent law categorizes them as one type
of patentable invention under the broad heading of "process" in
Section 101 of the Patent Act. 10 As gaming technology has advanced
to include realistic simulations of live gaming performance, patent law
has kept pace by extending process patents over various aspects of
game play. These gaming process patents are the concern of this
Article because they interfere with the live performance of games,
traditionally left free from the restrictions of intellectual property law.
Unlike copyright law, however, patent law does not exempt live
performances from protection. In fact, process patents can include the
live, unrecorded enactment of events.'1 Consequently, I propose a
limitation on process patents that interfere with game playing. Since
Baker imposes a distinction between patent law and copyright law by
removing systems, methods, and processes from the domain of
copyright law, 12 the line drawn by the U.S. Supreme Court in Baker
between patent and copyright should be read as a limitation on patent
law as well. As I propose in Part III, the Court's concern in Baker was
that copyright ownership would interfere with use and practice of a
field if copyright law protection extended to methods, processes, and
systems. This same concern of interference with use and practice
should inform how we understand the scope of patent protection for
processes as well.
This concern, within the scope of process patents, has been the
recent focus of judicial scrutiny, though not in the context of Baker.
The Federal Circuit has revitalized the doctrine of patentable subject
8. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
9. For a history of Baker v. Selden, see Pamela Samuelson, The Story of Baker v.
Selden: Sharpening the Distinction Between Authorship and Invention, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY STORIES 159-93 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2005).
10. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
11. See, e.g., Method of Putting, U.S. Patent No. 5,616,089 (filed Mar. 29, 1996)
(issued April 1, 1997).
12. See Samuelson, supra note 9.
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matter in response to criticisms that patents are too broad and
encroach on traditionally non-proprietary domains, such as business
methods or regulatory techniques. 13 The court recently addressed the
meaning of patentable processes in its In re Bilski decision, 14 which
seems to narrow the scope of processes that can be patented. This
important doctrinal development, which I discuss in greater detail in
Part III, affects the patentability of games and qualifies my reliance
on the analysis in Baker as the solution to the problem of game
patents intruding on game play. Nonetheless, there are several
questions left unanswered by the Federal Circuit's decision in Bilski,
and therefore the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in Baker is still
important in determining the scope of patent rights. Furthermore, the
reasoning of Baker may strengthen the reasoning of the Bilski
majority and justify even more scrutiny of process patents,
particularly in the field of gaming.
The argument in this Article develops these issues as follows:
Part II presents several examples of patenting games. Part III
analyzes game patents in light of intellectual property theory and
policy, particularly the legacy of Baker. Part IV carries forth the
metaphor of gaming by presenting doctrinal strategies to mitigate
some of the concerns I raise regarding game patenting.
II. GAMING PATENTS IN ACTION
Patents on toys and games date back to the nineteenth century
in the United States. These patents include the famous Monopoly
board game from 1935,15 as well as its predecessor, the Landlord game
from 1904.16 These patents typically cover the gaming apparatus
itself-the board, the dice, and other items that facilitated the game
play-as well as the rules of the game. By contrast, European patents
in the field of gaming have covered the apparatus, but have excluded
the rules of the game.' 7 Modern U.S. patents in the gaming area have
continued the pattern of covering both apparatus and game rules.'8
13. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that transformations of
public or private legal obligations not patentable subject matter).
14. Id.
15. See Board Game Apparatus, U.S. Patent No. 2,026,082 (filed Aug. 31, 1935)
(issued Dec. 1935).
16. U.S. Patent No. 748,626 (filed Mar. 23, 1903) (issued Jan. 5, 1904).
17. See WILLIAM CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS, AND ALLIED RIGHTS 210 (5th ed. 2003) (citing
precedent holding that rules of a game are not patentable, whereas equipment for a game
is patentable).
18. See discussion infra Part II.C.
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There has been one important development: as gaming technology
made it possible to simulate real performance of a game, U.S. patents
expanded to cover methods for simulating real-time play as well as
gaming moves. 19 Patents on performing games potentially preempt
live performances of games that they do not typically cover.
In this Part, I will provide some background in regards to these
issues, using cases to illustrate. Although the case law is not
extensive, the one published opinion that relates to patenting games
indicates the potential problems raised by these patents and proposes
possible solutions.20 In addition, a seminal decision involving the
First Amendment in the context of fantasy games provides a broader
perspective on the intersection of intellectual property and gaming,
with consequential limitations on establishing property rights on
games. 2
1
A. Fantasy Sports-Related Case Law
In 2002 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
decided a case relating to fantasy sports, Fantasy Sports Properties,
Inc. v. Sportsline. Corn, Inc. 22 At issue in the case was a patent on
"computerized statistical football games" that was issued in 1990 and
assigned to a fantasy sports football company that owned a paid
website to facilitate play.23 The assignee sued Yahoo!, ESPN, and
Sportsline for each operating their own computerized games with
enhancement software that infringed the 1990 patent.24 The court
affirmed a finding of non-infringement against Yahoo! and ESPN, but
reversed the finding of non-infringement against Sportsline, the
distributor of the enhancement software. 25
The first claim of the 1990 patent covered a computer program
for setting up a fantasy football league. 26 It was based upon an actual
football game consisting of the following elements: (1) a means for
setting up football franchises, (2) a means for drafting actual football
19. See discussion infra Part II.C.
20. Fantasy Sports Prop., Inc. v. Sportsline.com, Inc., 287 F.3d 1108, 1111-12 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (discussing patent at issue).
21. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.,
505 F.3d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 2007).
22. See supra note 20, at 1120.
23. Computerized Statistical Football Game, U.S. Patent No. 4,918,603 (filed Aug.
1, 1988) (issued Apr. 17, 1990).
24. Fantasy Sports Prop., 287 F.3d at 1111.
25. Id.
26. Computerized Statistical Football Game, U.S. Patent No. 4,918,603 (filed Aug.
1, 1988) (issued Apr. 17, 1990).
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players, (3) a means for selecting starting players, (4) a means for
trading football players, and (5) a means for scoring performances of
players based upon actual game scores so that franchisees can
calculate a composite score automatically. 27 The first claim also states
that the scores in the last element are for quarterbacks, running
backs, and pass receivers in one group, kickers in another, and that
these players receive bonus points.28  The central legal issue in
Fantasy Sports was the interpretation of the "bonus points."
According to the prosecution history on which the district and
appellate courts relied, the patentee added the feature of bonus points
in order to overcome a patent rejection based on a prior art
publication.2 9 This publication described a game in which additional
points were added for distance scoring and total yardage.30 The court
construed the limitation to mean any 'bonus points in addition to
normal points for scoring play," and found that the patentee had
disclaimed any additional points added for distance scoring and total
yardage. 31 Based on this construction, Yahoo! was not infringing
because its game did not allow for additional points except for those
based on total yardage. 32 Similarly, ESPN's game did not allow bonus
points at all. The Federal Circuit affirmed both of these rulings.
33
But the court reversed the district court's findings that Sportsline's
game was not infringing; while its software allowed users to customize
the game to include bonus points, the game itself as distributed did
not include the bonus points as a limitation on the patent.
34
Therefore, there were questions of fact as to whether Sportsline's
game was infringing.
While the gaming patent at issue in Fantasy Sports was not
infringed upon, the broader context of the case illustrates problems
with patents on games more generally. Fantasy sports games are a
large and pervasive activity in the United States and Canada with
over 29.9 million participants. 35 The games are well-organized with a
national organization that governs play and establishes standards for
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Fantasy Sports Prop., 287 F.3d at 1112.
30. Id. at 1115.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1116.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1117.
35. Fantasy Sports Industry Grows to a $800 Million Industry With 29.9 Million
Players, EMEDIAWIRE, July 10, 2008, http://www.emediawire.com/releases/2008/7
/emw108 4 994 .htm.
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the leagues. 36 Furthermore, a lot of fantasy sports play is done
privately or in associations that may be outside the purview of private
or governmental regulation. Given the wide range of involvement in
fantasy sports, the potential broad scope of patents on fantasy sports
may interfere with the rights of users. Admittedly, the patent at issue
here, like several similar patents, covers only computer-based fantasy
sports.37 This limitation would exclude much of the fantasy league
play outside the reach of the patent-the play that occurs through
paper or other non-electronic media. However, if the organizer
implements play through a computer by, for example, using a website
or even a spreadsheet, there is a question of whether the game is
computerized and therefore infringing. Hence, the ambiguity of the
patent's scope may have troubling implications for actual play.
The court's approach in Fantasy Sports illustrates one way to
deal with the potential reach of the patent. By strict construction of
"bonus points," combined with judicious application of prosecution
history to narrow its interpretation, the court narrowed the scope of
the patent to prevent a broad reach for infringement claims. 38 At the
same time, however, the Federal Circuit's reversal opened the door for
a wide range of claims based on how the game's actual players define
bonus points. The Federal Circuit's decision found a matter of factual
dispute in Sportsline's argument that the game cannot be
programmed by users to allow the bonus points that would infringe
Fantasy Sports' claims. 39 The court stated that this limitation on
users was not clear from the record and that there was the possibility
that the software would in fact allow users to modify the game in a
way that would infringe. 40 As a result, the case illustrates how closely
courts might construe design decisions in patents involving fantasy
sports, especially when the games are interactive and can be modified
by users, a practice that is becoming more popular across game
genres. For example, a Playstation 3 game released in 2008, Little Big
Planet, features user-created game levels that can be published and
shared among players. 41 Moreover, the intellectual property issues
36. See Fantasy Sports Association, http://www.fantasysportsassociation.org/ (last
visited Mar. 19, 2009); Fantasy Sports Trade Association, http://www.fsta.org/ (last visited
Mar. 19, 2009).
37. See, e.g., Interactive Fantasy Lottery, U.S. Patent No. 6,656,042 (filed Mar. 26,
2001) (issued Dec. 2, 2003).
38. See supra note 20, at 1116.
39. Fantasy Sports Prop., 287 F.3d at 1119.
40. Id.
41. Cyndy Aleo-Carreira, Is Sony Censoring Little Big Planet's User-Generated
Content?, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Nov. 18, 2008, http://www.thestandard.com/news
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involved with these kinds of creations are already a subject of
discourse, particularly in the context of the virtual world Second Life,
which is created nearly entirely by the players.
42
B. Fantasy Games and the First Amendment
The treatment of simulated, or fantasy, games under
intellectual property law was also at issue in the Eighth Circuit case
C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing Inc. v. Major League Baseball,
which illustrated the reach of the First Amendment to protect creators
and distributors of fantasy sports.43 The case originated from a
licensing agreement between CBC and Major League Baseball (the
League) that permitted CBC to run several fantasy sports games on
its web site. 44 After a few years, the League and CBC terminated
their arrangement, and the license was given to someone else who
would run the games under the trademarks and authorization of the
League. 45 However, CBC continued to use player data and names in
its games. 46 The Major League Baseball Players Association brought a
claim against CBC for violation of the players' right of publicity, and
the League intervened, alleging that CBC was violating a "no-use and
no-contest provision" of its original contract.47 The district court ruled
in favor of CBC, holding, first, that its First Amendment rights to use
sports statistics and names trumped the publicity rights of the
players. 48  Second, the district court found that the contract was
preempted by the Constitution, which favors the use of ideas not
protected by intellectual property laws. 49 The Eighth Circuit affirmed
both rulings, following the district court on the First Amendment
issue but taking a different course with respect to the contract
claims. 50  On the contract claims, the appellate court adopted a
technical contract argument, finding that the League was in breach of
/2008/11/18/sony-censoring-little-big-planets-user-generated-content (noting that there are
already an estimated 84,000 user-created levels).
42. Greg Lastowka, User-Created Content and Virtual Worlds, 10 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 893, 910 (2008); see also, e.g., Cory Ondrejka, Escaping the Gilded Cage: User-
Created Content and Building the Metaverse, in THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW, GAMES, AND
VIRTUAL WORLDS 158-79 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simon Noveck eds., 2006).
43. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.,
505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007).
44. Id. at 820-21.





50. Id. at 824.
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the contract, and therefore CBC was excused from performance on the
contract.51 One judge dissented on the contract point (while agreeing
with the First Amendment analysis).
52
Although it does not address a question of patent law, the
decision's broad application to First Amendment law and principles as
well as its reference to constitutional intellectual property issues has
implications for the intellectual property protection of fantasy sports
more broadly. There is an open question of whether the First
Amendment might protect various aspects of game play: whether the
games involve the invocation of ideas associated with the players such
as their names or statistics, and whether they involve other expressive
dimensions of the game.53 Furthermore, the court's strict construction
of the contract in C.B.C. Distribution, much like the strict construction
of the patent at issue in Fantasy Sports,54 illustrates how other courts
might view intellectual property claims that attempt to enjoin the
playing of these games. Even if these cases reflect the idiosyncrasies
of the particular courts that decided them, the arguments in these
opinions are useful in predicting the outcome of future cases.
C. Patents in Fantasy Sports Games
Two cases do not indicate a trend, and do not provide enough
material to build a doctrinal cathedral. Nonetheless, it is useful to
predict how these decisions might work in other cases involving
patents on fantasy sports games. To develop this point more fully,
consider the twenty-two patents at issue in Fantasy Sports. These
citing patents are listed in the following table.
51. Id. at 825.
52. Id. at 826.
53. For a discussion of whether the First Amendment protects functional speech
that is potentially the subject of patent protection, see Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79
TEX. L. REV. 99, 150-51 (2000) (exploring the potential First Amendment limits on patented
protection of digital expression, and by extension other functional speech, through a fair
use doctrine).
54. See 287 F.3d 1108, 1117-18 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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Actual play Seasonal game
Feb. 25, 1992
(50907:35)
Systems and methods for providing
multiple user support for shared user Feb. 21, 2006
equipment in a fantasy sports contest (7001279)
application
Method of conducting a fantasy sports Dec. 30, 2003Actual play
game (6669565)
Computer Interactive game system and 
method May 28, 1991
(5018736)
Nov. 23. 1993




Computer Electronic football game 
23 2
5772512)
Method and system for automatic running Jan. 5. 1999
of tournaments (5855516)
Oct. 26. 1999
Computer Interactive contest system 
(597194
(5971854)
Electronic game system, method of Sept. 12, 2000
managing and regulating said system (6117011)
Method and apparatus for gaming in a Dec. 26, 2000
series of sessions (6165071)
Device, method and storage medium for Aug. 28, 200i









Computer Fantasy Internet sports game 
(671855
(6371855)
Method and apparatus for interactive real Jan. 11, 2005
time distributed gaming (6840861)
Oct. 10, 2006
Computer Gaming award techniques 
(7118479)
(7118479)
Interactive professional wrestling fantasy Dec. 4, 2007
contest system (7303472)
Method and apparatus for broadcasting
live events to another location and Mar. 20, 2001
producing a computer simulation of the (6204862)
events at that location
Representing sub-events with physical May 13, 2008
exertion actions (7373587)
Aug. 25, 1998
Wagering Data analysis system 
(599
(5797796)
System and method for predicting the Aug. 29, 2000
outcome of college football games (6112128)
Dec. 2, 2003
Wagering Interactive fantasy lottery 
(665602
(6656042)
Wagering Systems and methods for facilitating a 
Apr. 29, 2008
wager (7364509)
Spanning the period from 1991 to 2008, these patents cover a
range of inventions in the area of gaming. Thirteen of these patents
describe the use of a computer or some physical medium for
interaction among players or for distributed play across a computer
network. 55 These patents are potentially troubling to the extent that
55. See supra Table: A Sample of Patents Covering Games (1991-2008) (listing
patents in the table with "computer" parenthetical in first column entry).
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they are interpreted as enjoining user modifications or enhancements
that simulate real play, as in Fantasy Sports.
A computerized version of a non-virtual game, such as football
or baseball, perhaps does not interfere with the real playing of these
games. However, there is a concern that as more play becomes
virtual, these patents might interfere with the values of game play,
such as user engagement and interactivity. 56  For those who
emphasize the negative effects of virtual play-mainly that it
impinges on "real" social interactions 57-such patents might have the
positive effect of raising the costs of virtual play and thereby
promoting real play. Perhaps this shift would be beneficial, but there
is concern about whether patent law should be used to further
promote what some consider "good" types of play.
Of greater concern are the patents that cover in-person social
interactions. Four of the twenty-two citing patents cover some form of
wagering, such as the patent on "Systems and Methods for
Facilitating a Wager."5 8  These patents potentially affect real-world
gambling activity that accompanies game playing. For example, the
last of these four patents covers the use of a computer to input and
assess wagers. 59 While the computer medium might seem like a
limitation, the claims could potentially cover situations where a real-
world bookie stores and pays bets using a Blackberry or a desktop
computer. Another of these four patents, "System and Method for
Predicting the Outcome of College Football Games," is not limited to
computers. Its first claim reads:
A system for predicting the outcome of college football games comprising,
in combination:
means for entering a season game number for two competing college football
teams;
means for entering a number of returning starting players for each of the two
competing college football teams;
56. See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 177-78 (2000) (expressing concern that interactions on the Internet
would lead to balkanization and social isolation).
57. See, e.g., Albert C. Lin, Virtual Consumption: A Second Life for Earth?, 2008
BYU L. REV. 47, 107-09 (2008) (noting a potential dark side to virtual relationships that
may counter the new types of social interactions that virtual worlds permit); Alexandra
Alter, Is This Man Cheating on His Wife?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2007, at W1 (noting
possible negative effects of virtual relationships on non-virtual relationships).
58. Systems & Methods for Facilitating a Wager, U.S. Patent No. 7,364,509 (filed




means for predicting a winner of a college football game based on the number
of returning starting players for each of the two competing college football
teams.
60
"[M]eans-plus-function claiming" potentially covers prediction
performed purely mentally, without the use of any physical medium.
61
Means-plus-function claims are construed in terms of means that are
disclosed in the specifications and equivalents. The specifications of
this patent, however, do not disclose a computer or some physical
medium as the preferred embodiment. 62
In addition, the remaining two of the wagering patents do not
limit embodiments to computers or physical media. The patent
entitled "Data analysis system" claims methods of predicting future
play based upon past performance and, on its face, would also cover
mental predictions. 63 Similarly, "Interactive fantasy lottery" covers an
interactive gambling situation among many players and would cover
computer-assisted play as well as live play.64 While some may find
patents promoting gambling morally reprehensible, my concern is a
different one. Patents that interfere with real game play should not
be permitted. By granting the patentee the right to exclude others
from using the invention, the government is permitting individuals to
potentially enjoin the playing of a game. This potential interference
creates a conflict with an expressive activity that both goes outside the
goals of the patent system and impinges on non-intellectual property
values.
There are two other categories of inventions covered by these
twenty-two patents that further illustrate my concerns. One covers
the real playing of a game. Another is the category of patents that
cover the broadcast of a game through simulation. This category
includes two patents: (1) 'Method and apparatus for broadcasting live
events to another location and producing a computer simulation of the
events at that location," and (2) "Representing sub-events with
physical exertion actions."65  These patents cover the simulation of
play in virtual environments by translating real-world play into
computerized media. Although these patents could not be used to
60. System & Method for Predicting the Outcome of College Football Games, U.S.
Patent No. 6,112,128 (filed June 8, 1999) (issued Aug. 29, 2000).
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. See Data Analysis System, U.S. Patent No. 5,797,796 (filed Oct. 28, 1996)
(issued Aug. 25, 1998).
64. See Interactive Fantasy Lottery, U.S. Patent No. 6,656,042 (filed Mar. 26, 2001)
(issued Dec. 2, 2003).
65. U.S. Patent No. 6,204,862 (filed June 9, 1997); U.S. Patent No. 7,373,587 (filed
Apr. 13, 2000).
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enjoin actual play since they cover the simulation, the inventions
describe ways to capture real play in a way that can be commoditized.
The remaining three of the twenty-two citing patents do cover
real play. The 1992 patent entitled "Seasonal Game" covers the
methods of playing fantasy versions of the playoffs of major sporting
leagues.66 Once again, the invention is not limited to any physical
embodiment and therefore could cover a wide range of simulated
gaming that can be embodied through different types of machines and
gaming devices. Finally, the patents entitled "Method of conducting a
fantasy sports game" and "Systems and methods for providing
multiple user support for shared user equipment in a fantasy sports
application" each cover methods for conducting fantasy sports games
and therefore could potentially enjoin actual gaming activity.67
My concern, however, is with the use of patents in a way that
interferes with real play. The argument is that playing itself is an
expressive act, one that captures human autonomy and social
interaction. Copyright excludes live performances, such as actual
game play, from its domain.68 Patents, however, come very close to
covering live performances. The two cases discussed in this Part
illustrate the treatment of play under intellectual property law.69 The
Federal Circuit's decision in Fantasy Sports illustrates how strictly
gaming patents can be construed, as well as how such patents can be
used to limit user modifications of a game, which itself is part of the
play.70 The Eighth Circuit's decision, on the other hand, demonstrates
how expressive values can be used as a limitation on intellectual
property rights. 71 The patents discussed in this Part, admittedly a
small sample from a large population, show the scope of patenting
activity and the potential pitfalls for users. In Part III, I analyze how
patent law, judiciously applied, can limit the effects of patents on
games and protect players.
66. U.S. Patent No. 5,090,735 (filed Apr. 26, 1991).
67. U.S. Patent No. 6,669,565 (filed Feb. 5, 2001); U.S. Patent No. 7,001,279 (filed
Aug. 20, 2002).
68. See, e.g., Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players' Ass'n, 805
F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986) (examining copyrightability of the live performance of a baseball
game and ownership of a recorded broadcast); Morissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d
675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967) (addressing the noncopyrightability of beauty pageant
proceedings); Prod. Contractors, Inc. v. WGN Cont'l Broad.Co., 622 F. Supp. 1500, 1503
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (addressing the noncopyrightability of a Christmas parade).
69. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.,
505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007); Fantasy Sports Prop., Inc. v. Sportsline.com, Inc., 287 F.3d
1108 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
70. See Fantasy Sports Prop., Inc., 287 F.3d at 1117-19.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
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III. DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS IN PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
AND THE RELEVANCE OF BAKER V. SELDEN
72
As mentioned earlier, copyright law does not cover live
performance, such as the actual play of a game. While this result is
established in the fixation requirement under copyright law, 73 the
principle represents, in part, the freedom to engage in activity outside
the purview of the law. For example, copyright law also excludes live
performances from the derivative work or reproduction right held by
the copyright owner. The recording of a live performance is protected
by copyright, but if a group of enthusiastic and imaginative people
watch or listen to the recording and act out the performance captured
in the recording, that act is not copyright infringement (unless such
performance is deemed to be public or constitute a derivative work).
74
In other words, play can occur without copyright infringement, and
the expressive values of play can be enjoyed without legal
interference.
Patent law should also respect such personal freedom and not
enjoin users from engaging in play. But as I maintained in the
previous Part, the patenting of various dimensions of gaming can
potentially impinge on the values of play.75 In the next section, I will
analyze two legal principles that can limit patent rights on games:
patentable subject matter and the aesthetics-function distinction.
A. Patentable Subject Matter
Although in desuetude for almost two decades as a limitation
on patentability, the doctrine of patentable subject matter has
recently made a resurgence in the courts, with the U.S. Supreme
Court nearly reviving the doctrine in 2006 and the Federal Circuit
giving the doctrine more bite in several 2007 decisions.76 The new
contours of patentable subject matter can place some limitations on
patenting games to protect users.
72. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 1999)
(discussing implications of the fixation requirement for live performances).
74. See, e.g., Lil' Joe Wein Music, Inc. v. Jackson, No. 06-20079-CIV, 2006 WL
5428227, at * 6 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (finding that chanting of a copyrighted rap song was not
copyright infringement), aff'd, 245 F. App'x 873 (11th Cir. 2007).
75. See supra text accompanying notes 68-71.
76. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006)
(per curiam); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed.
Cir. 2008); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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The patentable subject matter doctrine excludes certain
categories of invention as undeserving of patenting because the
categories are contrary to the goals of the patent system. 77 Some
academics and policymakers have proposed immoral subject matter, or
other potentially harmful subject matter, as being outside the patent
system's structure of rewards and incentives. 78 As a practical matter,
however, agencies and courts have found it difficult to define these
categories with any precision.79 For example, exclusion of software
proved difficult as computer programs became integrated into
hardware and became impossible to distinguish from other machines
that had been traditionally protected by patents.80 Furthermore, the
legislative history, endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court, extended
patentable subject matter to "anything manmade under the Sun," a
poetic way of saying "everything."
8'
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit, associated with an expansive
notion of patentable subject matter in noteworthy cases such as State
Street v. Signature Financial,8 2 has recently struggled to find some
limitations on what can be excluded from patenting as a threshold
matter. This watershed holding was a response to concerns that
patentable subject matter had expanded too broadly to include
questionable items that have contours too difficult to draw within
definable and meaningful patent scope.8 3 One tactic that the Federal
Circuit has taken is to read the Patent Act's definition of "patent
subject" narrowly, which under Section 101 includes "process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter," or "improvement
thereof."8 4 In In re Nuijten, the court used this language to hold that
an electronic signal was not patentable subject matter, as it was not a
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
8 5
Nonetheless, a strict construction of the statute could
potentially narrow the scope of patentable subject matter. In a
77. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 951 (setting forth statutory categories of patent-
eligible subject matter).
78. See, e.g., Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and
Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469 (2003).
79. See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959-61 (describing problems with adopting a
categorical approach for non-patentable subject matter).
80. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92 (1981).
81. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP.
NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
82. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
83. Id. at 1373 (discussing patentable subject matter as an issue of statutory
limitations on scope of patenting).
84. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
85. 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
[Vol. 11:4:871
PATENTING GAMES
companion case to In re Nuijten, the Federal Circuit narrowed
patentable subject matter through a judicially created doctrine known
as the "mental steps doctrine," which limits patentable subject matter
to inventions that have a physical embodiment.8 6 Processes, for
example, that are purely mental would be excluded from the reach of
the patent law. The Federal Circuit's decision In re Comiskey
illustrates this doctrine in action.87 Comiskey sought to patent a
method of arbitration.8 8  The invention described purely human
interaction and did not invoke a physical embodiment (although the
patentee unsuccessfully argued that the use of pencil and paper
constituted a physical embodiment of the method).8 9 The Federal
Circuit upheld the United States Patent and Trademark Office's
(USPTO) rejection of the application under the mental steps
doctrine. 90 While this doctrine appears to be a judicious way to limit
patenting to physical embodiments, the rule could potentially
artificially force inventors to create physical embodiments, such as
computer or machine-based applications that may not truly be
inventive, as a way to sidestep the rule. Nonetheless, In re Comiskey
shows that the Federal Circuit is concerned with limiting the scope of
patentable subject matter.
This focus was reinforced by the Federal Circuit granting en
banc review of the USPTO's rejection of an application for a method of
hedging financial risk by Bilski.91 On October 30, 2008, the Federal
Circuit issued a groundbreaking opinion affirming the rejection of the
claims.92 The court, relying extensively on U.S. Supreme Court
precedent in the area of software patents, 93 adopted a "machine-or-
transformation" test for determining when a claimed process is
patentable subject matter. 94 Under this test, a process is patentable
subject matter if it is either implemented in a machine or is a physical
transformation. 95 In applying this test to the claims at issue in Bilski,
the court found that there was no machine implementation and
86. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
87. See In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
88. Id. at 970.
89. Id. at 972-73.
90. Id. at 980.
91. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 952.
94. Id. at 956.
95. Id. at 961-62.
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concluded that the mere shifting of legal obligations or economic risk
does not constitute a physical transformation.
96
The Federal Circuit's articulation of when a transformation
does not constitute patentable subject matter is revealing. The court
rejected the patentability of Bilski's method of hedging the risk of
commodity prices because the method was not machine-implemented
and because the method did
not transform any article to a different state or thing. Purported transformations
or manipulations simply of public or private legal obligations or relationships,
business risks, or other such abstractions cannot meet the test because they are
not physical objects or substances, and they are not representative of physical
objects or substances. Applicants' process at most incorporates only such ineligible
transformations.
9 7
This newly articulated test has implications for non-machine-
implemented gaming patents that apply to mental processes, such as
wagering. Such methods do not entail a physical transformation.
Instead, they constitute the type of abstract transformations of
business relationships that are not patent-eligible. The decision in
Bilski reduces patent-eligible processes to those that entail a physical
transformation, one that is captured through some physical medium
or that occurs through a machine. 98 Read this way, gaming patents
would be available for the tools of gaming (gaming apparatus such as
boards or dice, for example, or their modern electronic equivalent) or
to the rules of the game that are embodied in a physical media. The
legal limitation parallels the fixation requirement of copyright law,
which limits copyrightable subject matter to that which is recorded in
a tangible medium.99 Consequently, live performances are excluded
from patent protection much like they are excluded from copyright
protection.
The Federal Circuit's decision in Bilski signals some likelihood
that the U.S. Supreme Court will grant review of the Federal Circuit's
decision. This prediction is based on the fact that the Court granted
review in the case of Laboratory Corp. v Metabolite in 2006.100 At
issue in Metabolite was a patent on a diagnostic tool that could, as one
96. Id. at 963-64.
97. Id. at 963.
98. Id. at 962-63 (analyzing the contours of transformation and adopting analogies
to physical transformations).
99. See, e.g., Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players' Ass'n, 805
F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986); Morissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir.
1967); Prod. Contractors, Inc. v. WGN Cont'l Broad.Co., 622 F. Supp. 1500, 1503 (N.D. Ill.
1985).




of its elements, correlate deficiencies of certain enzymes with a
vitamin B-12 deficiency. 101 Academics and practitioners anticipated
that the Court would make a pronouncement on the scope of
patentable subject matter and the mental steps doctrine.10 2 Instead,
the Court concluded that certiorari had been improvidently granted,
letting stand the lower court's ruling on infringement. 103 Justice
Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, authored a strong
dissent, arguing that certiorari had been proper and that the patent
was invalid as unpatentable subject matter.10 4 Specifically, Justice
Breyer was concerned with a patent that covered mental activity,
namely establishing a mathematical correlation.105 The strength of
Justice Breyer's dissent and the additional scrutiny by the Federal
Circuit in Bilski point to a good chance that the U.S. Supreme Court
will rule on the question of patentable subject matter soon.
What can we glean about patentable subject matter as a
possible limitation on gaming patents? To the extent that the mental
steps doctrine has been revived, one might predict that patents on
predictive activity, such as the wagering patents described above, may
be outside the scope of patentable subject matter. Wagering is
arguably a mental activity, and patents that cover wagering not
embodied in a computer or other physical medium should, and will
likely, be invalidated like the arbitration patent in Comiskey.10 6
Furthermore, method patents that cover the playing of a game should
also be invalidated to the extent that playing is seen as a mental
activity. This last premise, however, is the difficult linchpin of the
argument against patentable subject matter. The playing of a game is
not a purely mental activity. It involves physical motion as well as
thought. Consequently, computer embodiments of play would likely
pass muster as patentable subject matter. However, patents on what
I call "actual play" may be suspect as not falling under statutory
subject matter. The Federal Circuit's decision against Nuijten might
support such a holding on the grounds that physical play is not a
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. But that
conclusion would require a strict construction of the statute.
101. Id. at 125.
102. See, e.g., Jeffrey Kuhn, Patentable Subject Matter Matters: New Uses For An
Old Doctrine, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 89, 90-91 (2007) (providing background on the Lab.
Corp. dispute).
103. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 548 U.S. at 127.
104. Id. at 128.
105. Id.
106. See In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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Patentable subject matter is an evolving doctrine, and
definitive conclusions of its effects on patenting games will depend on
the meaning of transformation, as articulated in the recent Federal
Circuit decision in Bilski.10 7 Nonetheless, we can see that there is
some limitation on patents in the gaming area and should develop
arguments that will build on the incipient case law.
B. The Legacy of Baker v. Seldens
The Federal Circuit's decision in Bilski arguably resolves the
concerns over gaming patents presented in this Article. But those
seeking even stronger prophylactic measures, or a foundation for the
limiting principles articulated in Bilksi, a U.S. Supreme Court
decision from 1880 may serve as an important limitation on patent
rights. 10 9 Baker v. Selden involved a copyright, owned by Selden, on a
book that presented a method for conducting accounting." 0 The book
contained instructions on accounting as well as ledgers and forms with
which to practice the art.' Baker had distributed a copy of the book
that included the ledgers and forms." 2 While the lower courts found
against Baker, the U.S. Supreme Court held that copyright protection
did not extend to the ledgers and forms depicted in Selden's book."
3
At the narrowest of levels, Baker has been read to mean that copyright
does not extend to blank forms. 1 4  But the decision sets out
fundamental policies in copyright law, policies that are also relevant
in patent law.
The Court presented an important distinction between
copyright and patent law. Copyright, the Court states, protects
expressive elements of a work, while patent law protects functional or
useful elements. 1 5 This distinction goes beyond subject matter like
software. Baker stands for the proposition that there is a difference
between the subject matter of copyright and that of patent, and that
this difference, very broadly, rests on the difference between
107. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
108. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 99-100.
111. Id. at 100.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 106.
114. See, e.g., Am. Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plan Ass'n, 126 F.3d 977, 981 (7th
Cir. 1997).
115. See Baker, 101 U.S. at 102-03.
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aesthetics and functionality. 116 Copyright law, as I show below, has
used this distinction to remove certain types of functional expression
from the domain of copyright protection. Baker excludes certain types
of aesthetic expression from the domain of patent protection. This
issue will be addressed first by showing where Baker stands under
modern copyright law and, second, by showing the implications for
patent law.
The holding of Baker has been codified in Section 102(b) of the
Copyright Act, which excludes a list of items from copyright
protection. 117  This list includes such items as ideas, methods of
operation, processes, and other functional expression. 1 8 Although
Section 102(b) does list quite a number of exclusions for copyrightable
subject matter, the case law does not provide an extensive analysis of
these numerous items.1 9
The primary legacy of Baker, however, is in the principle
informing the application of Section 102(b): copyright allows the owner
to prevent unauthorized uses of the expression, but not any uses
described in the work. 20 For example, if I read a book about origami,
I can practice origami without infringing the book's copyright. The
book is intended to teach readers how to practice origami, and
therefore I am allowed to practice the art taught without violating
copyright law. Note that this protection of the user is not a matter of
implied license. The protection comes from recognizing that the
practice of the art is not within the scope of copyright. This
implication is a broad one, but also a subtle one. This principle limits
copyright protection to the form in which ideas, methods, or processes
are described, but never to the idea, method, or process itself. In
Baker, Selden's copyright on the accounting book did give Selden any
right in the practice of accounting, including the use of forms. 121
Copyright protection does not extend to methods, systems, or
116. See Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes
from the Scope of Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1927-28 (2007) (noting that the holding
of Baker excluded useful arts from copyright protection, which does cover expressive
works).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
118. Id.
119. See Samuelson, supra note 3, at 1945.
120. See Baker, 101 U.S. at 106 ("Surely the exclusive right to this practical use was
not reserved to the publisher by his copyright of the [work].").
121. Id. ("The very object of publishing a book on science or the useful arts is to
communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it contains. But this object would be
frustrated if the knowledge could not be used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the
book.").
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processes, all of which are the basis for using the practice described in
the accounting books.
Throughout the Copyright Act, the holding and reasoning of
Baker has wide application, most notably in the area of software
copyright. In a typical suit for copyright infringement, the plaintiff
has to separate the functional elements of the software from the non-
functional elements and demonstrate infringement of the latter.
122
Anyone is free to copy the functional elements-those elements that
are present to allow the software to operate. I have described this
separation as the line between functionality and aesthetics, but of
course that terminology is misleading since functional expression can
be deemed aesthetic under the appropriate theory of beauty. Perhaps
a better way to understand the distinction was how the Court in Baker
did it, recognizing that there are different types of expression and
different types of uses of works. 123 Copyright law does not permit the
owner to control all types of uses and all types of expression. Instead,
there are classes of uses and expressions, labeled functional, that are
exempt from copyright protection. 124 What this class entails is a
matter of practical determination.
Since the Court in Baker was drawing a distinction between
patent and copyright, distinguishing them in terms of functionality
and uses, it seems that Baker offers a lesson in patent law as well as
in copyright law. Unlike copyright law, which codifies the holding of
Baker in section 102(b), Congress has not provided an analogous
codification in patent law. But nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court's
reasoning in Baker teaches us the implications for patent law. Just as
with copyright, so with patent: there is a class of uses-call them non-
functional-to which patentable subject matter does not extend. This
class of uses places a limitation on the processes a patent can cover.
They comprise the negative space of the Baker decision.
I propose the following statement to describe the implication of
the holding of Baker for patent law: patentable subject matter does not
include expressive activity that is non-functional or aesthetic. This
statement has immediate application to the patents on games that I
have analyzed in this Article. It may have a broader application as
well, but I leave the exploration of the breadth of this interpretation to
future research. In the context of games, patents should not extend to
mental activities or to activities that constitute the playing of the
122. See, e.g., Computer Assoc. Intern., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703 (2d Cir.
1992) (citing Baker v. Selden in the context of a filtration test).
123. See Baker, 101 U.S. at 106
124. See Samuelson, supra note 9.
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game. Patents are limited to functional aspects of the game, such as
the hardware, or to processes that are independent of play, such as
scoring or the representation of play through broadcast or graphical
media. By drawing this distinction, the law respects the separation
that the Court recognized over one hundred and fifty years ago in
Baker and that Congress has codified in copyright law. In this way,
the boundaries between two statutory fields are respected and proper
protection is given to the expressive values associated with playing.
A comparison with the treatment of game patents in Europe
under the European Patent Convention supports the interpretation of
Baker advocated here. In Europe, patents on games are looked upon
with scrutiny analogous to that applied to software and business
method patents. 125 While patents on gaming tools are recognized,
patents on gaming rules and play are generally not allowed. 126 This
exception is based on the idea that patents should apply to the
"technical arts," or inventions that have industrial application. 127 In
Bilski, the Federal Circuit rejected such categorical exclusions
(articulated in the United States as a technological arts exclusion) on
the grounds that what constitutes technology is ever changing and
ambiguous.1 28  More broadly, the Federal Circuit eschews any
categorical exclusion for patentable subject matter, such as exclusions
for business methods, on similar grounds.1 29 Instead, the Federal
Circuit has adopted a functional approach to excluding certain types of
subject matter, illustrated by its definition of physical transformation
or machine implementation. 130 While the physical transformation test
may have some bite, by excluding transformations that are merely
legal or social, the machine implementation requirement may have no
valence whatsoever. Consequently, the scope of gaming patents in the
United States may be quite broad, even after the Bilski decision.
Hence, my proposed interpretation of Baker as a restriction on
patentable subject matter as well as on copyrightable subject matter
may provide a means to supplement the Bilski holding and perhaps
even clarify it. As if drawing a line between patent and copyright,
Baker seems to relegate aesthetic subject matter to the domain of
copyright and functional subject matter to the domain of patent.
However, since much subject matter is mixed, including the
accounting book in Baker, this narrow reading is not viable. More
125. See CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 17.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960 (rejecting a technological arts test).
129. Id. at 960-61 (rejecting categorical exclusion for business methods).
130. Id. at 961.
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importantly, Baker is not simply about allocating subject matter to
particular fields of intellectual property, but more broadly concerns
subject matter that is excluded from intellectual property protection
across the various regimes. The Court's concern in Baker is with the
scope of intellectual property protection and its effects on the use of
the protected subject matter.131 The tension is that patent law does
give the patentee the right to exclude others from using the protected
subject matter while the copyright holder has the right to exclude only
specified uses (copying, adapting, performing publicly, displaying
publicly, distributing, and digitally audio-transmitting). 132 The Baker
decision, however, suggests that we must be wary about how broadly
these limitations on use are read.133 Patents on processes, systems,
and methods, in light of Baker, should not interfere with the practice
of the arts to which those apply. A patent on the accounting methods
at issue in Baker should be narrowly construed to those specific
protected processes, methods, and systems.
Understood another way, Bilski's holding relates to the
interpretation of "process" in Section 101 of the Patent Act.' 34
However, Baker is much broader and relates to the meaning of the
words "Inventors" and "Discoveries" in Article One, Section 8, Clause 8
of the U.S. Constitution. 135 If the Court in Baker is declaring that
processes, systems, and methods do not constitute "Writings" or the
subject matter of "Author[ship]" and that these items are instead the
provenance of "Inventor[ship]" and constitute "Discoveries," then the
decision invites us to dig more deeply into the relationship between
inventorship and authorship. Are these mutually exclusive categories,
such that all subject matter is the product of either inventorship or
authorship, and never both? More realistically, it seems that some
subject matter may not be the provenance of either. Trademarks
would be the classic example, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's own
jurisprudence. 136  Live performances would be another example.
Clearly excluded from copyright law, live performances, as a subset of
the broader category of use, should also be excluded from patent law.
In this way, Baker can be read as an implicit limitation on what uses
the patent owner can prevent based on the scope of what the patent
owner has actually invented.
131. Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99, 105-106 (1879).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 117-19
133. Baker, 101 U.S. at 106.
134. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
136. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879) (holding that trademarks are not
writings under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution).
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It is important to note that my argument here has implications
beyond gaming. If I am correct that Baker, when applied to patent
law, places a limitation on what uses can be prevented by the
patentee, my argument would apply to other activities beyond game
playing, such as research. More to the point, my argument can be
understood as reinforcing the distinction between using tools and
learning about those tools. The tool's patentee can prevent the former
use, but the latter is protected as an experimental use. In the context
of gaming, patents can extend to certain gaming tools but not to the
underlying gaming activities that are involved in a particular game.
The argument here is that these limitations on the scope of the patent
right follow from the decision of Baker, which on its surface seems to
be solely a limitation on copyright. But the Court has stated that the
case is about the relationship between copyright and patent;
137
therefore, it is logical that the Court's reasoning has implications for
patent law. In light of the Federal Circuit's recent attention to
patentable subject matter, this inquiry seems even timelier.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article focused on patents on games and gaming and their
potential conflict with the actual playing of games by users. This
potential conflict between ownership rights and use mandates the
need for limitations on the scope of patents. Such limits can be found
in the doctrine of patentable subject matter, especially in light of the
recent revival of that doctrine by the Federal Circuit, which has
limited patentable processes under its machine-or-transformation test.
But my analysis has also focused heavily on Baker v. Selden, an old
chestnut of intellectual property case law that, among other things,
drew the line between copyright and patent. Although it is a case
about copyright subject matter, I have argued that Baker also speaks
to the scope of patentable subject matter. Specifically, I asserted that
patentable subject matter should not interfere with aesthetic activity
such as gaming and play, much like copyrightable subject matter
should not interfere with function and use. Since the Court's decision
in Baker pertains to constitutional limits on intellectual property, my
argument for limits on gaming patents is grounded not only in the
statutory analysis of the federal circuit, but also in constitutional
analysis.
My concern over the scope of patents on gaming also reflects a
balance in intellectual property between machine recordings and live
137. See Baker, 101 U.S. at 102-03.
20091
898 VANDERBILTJ. OFENT. AND TECH. LAW [Vol. 11:4:871
performances. Copyright law statutorily covers only fixations of
performances and not performances themselves. Patent law does not
have a similar statutory limit and so, absent some legal limitations,
patents could cover live human activity. But this Article has urged
such a limitation by relying on an analysis of patentable subject
matter. Patents that cover the actual performance of a game or other
forms of expression should be suspect for the reasons articulated in
this Article. If the realm of live, unrecorded play has escaped capture
by copyright law, then that special realm should remain unclaimed as
patent law expands its boundaries.
